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Blockchain technology promises disruptive change 
to industry and society. Although academic 
researchers and practitioners have engaged with 
blockchain for years, actual adoption rates of this 
technology significantly lag predictions. This paper 
explores present barriers to blockchain adoption in an 
industry for which blockchain might be assumed to 
offer an obvious solution to a globally distributed 
challenge: the integration of carbon markets. Using 
technological framing theory as a focusing lens, we 
investigate the challenges of blockchain adoption in 
China’s developing carbon markets from three expert 
groups: carbon market experts with blockchain 
knowledge only, carbon market experts with 
blockchain projects, and IT experts in carbon markets. 
Our findings suggest that different expert groups 
present distinctive and incongruent framing challenges 
where technical challenges are not the most 
significant. In exploring this we make contributions to 
the introduction of a socio-technical perspective in 
blockchain adoption research and provide practical 
suggestions to policymakers and practitioners. 
1. Introduction  
Blockchains are open, append-only, distributed 
networks that are regulated through a peer consensus 
mechanism and secured with cryptography [1][2]. 
Blockchain promises to revolutionize industries and re-
define basic structures in economic, legal, and political 
systems [3]. This potential is characterized by five 
fundamental principles: decentralization, data 
immutability, transparency, strict verification, and 
privacy and security [4][5]. In the most primordial 
blockchain system, transaction records are 
continuously inscribed onto a ledger within a certain 
time and packed together onto a “block”. Through a 
hashing function, each block creates an irreversible 
cryptographic link to its previous block together with 
identical timestamps and data of all transactions 
recorded on this unit. This linking action, as well as 
verification, proceeds through shared governance 
protocols across all participating nodes within the 
network. After linking, each node will contain a 
complete record of all the transactions in that 
blockchain. When blocks are chained as a growing list, 
they become virtually immutable and resist deletion, 
tampering, and revision from any single actor. 
To launch a retroactive alteration on “chained” 
transactional data, the network majority must run 
cryptographic algorithms to assess and verify the 
features of the proposed individual block. A consensus 
must be obtained among the majority to change all 
subsequent blocks [6]. Such resilience to data 
manipulation enables blockchain to displace traditional 
trust-based intermediaries and to effectively secure the 
data in blockchain ledgers against unauthorized access 
and manipulation. This process also provides 
credibility for users to conduct a holistic audit trail of 
activities [7]. Further, blockchain can be enhanced with 
the addition of smart contracts that refer to a 
predefined computerized protocol to enable automatic 
enforcement of the relevant transactions once 
negotiated conditions are met [8]. This serves as a 
digital representation of governance rules and 
verification guidelines for managing digital assets. 
Blockchain can be designed as either a 
permissionless or permissioned governance structure. 
For a permissioned blockchain, participants must gain 
authorized access before joining to set up network 
nodes. Such access is controlled by a consortium or by 
a central organization and assessed through predefined 
compliance criteria [6]. Permissionless blockchains 
however, allow users to remain anonymous in setting 
up nodes. For example, Bitcoin adopts a permissionless 
structure where there is no entry barrier to 
participation. Such a network has free access for its 
participants to all transaction records. 
      Given such clearly stated technical strengths 
and a match with global movements towards 
cooperative, decentralized decision-making processes 





supported by more widely distributed shared 
infrastructure, it may appear surprising that adoption of 
blockchain has lagged predictions [9][10]. To explore 
this for a global cooperative movement where assets 
need to be registered and exchanged to better address a 
common goal, we ask: what are the perceived 
challenges of blockchain adoption in carbon markets?  
2. Blockchain and carbon markets 
A blockchain research community started to 
emerge in 2013 and has shown rapid growth since 
2016 [11][12]. Early research focused on 
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and development of 
their protocols, design details of the peer-to-peer 
transaction network or characterization of the 
ecosystem [13][14][15][16][17]. These discussions set 
the tone of blockchain perceptions in related 
application areas and the direction of research 
development with more than 80% of studies 
emphasizing technical perspectives of blockchain and 
cryptocurrency systems and less than 20% dealing with 
blockchain adoption and implementation [16].  
Within these we focus on studies that investigate 
socio-technical aspects and implications of blockchain 
adoption for the individual, organization, and society 
[5][17][18]. We find that adoption challenges from 
business and societal perspectives have received little 
attention [19] yet are critical when blockchain’s 
capacity for radical innovation is through concurrent 
introduction of new management models and 
organizational practices [5]. 
In terms of an application focus, we also find that 
depth in blockchain application research has been 
narrowly focussed on finance and the supply chain. In 
the arena of carbon markets there are influential 
whitepapers and working papers that have shaped the 
discussion of blockchain application [20][21][22][23], 
yet the scholarly literature exploring blockchain 
application in this context remains superficial.  
Carbon markets mainly involve trading services, 
recorded as a certain amount of carbon credits and 
offsets. Every single carbon credit or offset represents 
the service of preventing one metric tonne of carbon 
dioxide equivalent (CO2-e) from entering the 
atmosphere. However, the process of monitoring, 
reporting, and verifying (MRV) the carbon amounts is 
complicated and vulnerable to freeriding [24]. While 
many organizations and experts have acknowledged 
the potential benefits and transformational nature of 
blockchain technology for climate actions, no large-
scale deployment of blockchain solutions in carbon 
markets has been delivered. To date, there are 
numerous organizational reports (such as UNFCCC 
and World Bank), research initiatives, and business 
proposals (white papers) highlighting potentials for the 
carbon industry, whilst those published in academic 
journals work split their focus on using blockchain to 
either create a new carbon market or update existing 
schemes [25]. Drawing broadly on the above literature, 
blockchain is recognised to offer carbon markets 
distinctive strengths from the following two aspects. 
 
2.1. Technical Strengths 
 
2.1.1. Transparency, immutability and trust. 
Blockchain delivers a tamper-proof transaction ledger 
that boosts market confidence and avoids transaction 
disavowal [4]. This ledger comes with transparency 
that increases the accountability of carbon mitigation 
efforts and maintains information credibility [26].  
A blockchain ledger for carbon trading can 
synthesize and support the transaction of all kinds of 
mitigation-related data (e.g., facility level, projects, 
quantified production, and life cycle attributes) in a 
shared, globally accessible environment [22]. This 
ledger system can avoid carbon leakage by allowing 
participants to trace and audit the end-to-end process. 
Blockchain raises the cost of conducting fraud of data, 
and tax evasion scams and boosts trust and confidence 
in the carbon market mechanism. 
The behavioural impacts of this could be profound. 
With all information under scrutiny, market 
participants are forced to behave in a responsible and 
accountable manner in collecting and recording data. 
Monitoring and verifying the source and ownership of 
carbon credits helps protect the trading from fraud and 
other problems such as double accounting [27][28]. 
The enhanced transparency also increases the 
carbon market’s efficiency by tackling asymmetric 
information at the transaction level. The current 
secondary market suffers from low liquidity and 
unstable prices [29]. Poor information sharing on 
carbon credit unit holdings and trading has distorted 
investment and price signals, such that one can know 
little about the reputation of its counterparties and the 
quality of their carbon unit credits [25]. Once the 
process of carbon credits issuance is trackable and 
information is more credible, potential purchasers will 
have more confidence in the credit’s quality and 
participate in the carbon markets more actively.  
 
2.1.2. Peer-to-peer efficiency and effectiveness. 
Blockchain-empowered carbon markets can increase 
the efficiency and effectiveness because it speeds up 
data transfer in peer to peer (P2P) networks [18][30] 
and widens the geographical scope of feasible trading. 
Such an infrastructure can be regarded as distributed 
database system that allows multiple participants to 
make alterations in the system at the same time. This 
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encourages individual participation in voluntary 
markets where they can save carbon emissions on a 
daily basis and exchange it freely with others. More 
importantly, blockchains enable the automated 
execution of smart contracts in P2P networks [31]. The 
automated trading platform will present price signals 
and information on carbon costs to consumers in an 
efficient way, simultaneously incentivizing them for 
demand response and smart management of their 
carbon allowance needs [32]. 
Blockchains can also increase the efficiency of the 
carbon markets by lowering transaction costs. The 
traditional MRV process includes complex work done 
‘in the field’ by many people and multiple layers of 
data checking and reporting, representing large human 
resource and time investments that may have 
significant opportunity costs. Smart contracts allow 
more automation of the MRV process, reducing the 
investment hurdle for project proponents and the 
bureaucratic overhead. Smart contracts can also be 
used to help generate the carbon credit units 
automatically, making the issuance process much 
simpler and reducing the barrier to entry of smaller 
mitigation projects. Currently, it takes a regulator 
several weeks to evaluate a report for carbon credit unit 
creation, hence blockchains offer the promise of faster 
regulation through real-time evaluation. 
Since existing carbon markets around the world are 
fragmented and heterogenous, networking should 
foster market liquidity, reduce compliance costs, 
promote environmental technology transfer and 
sustainable practices [27][33][34]. However, 
networking has been held back by multiple challenges: 
harmonization of MRV provisions [33][35], double 
accounting [27][36], loss of regulatory autonomy 
[37][38]. The emergence of blockchain provides a 
bottom-up solution to networking carbon markets 
without forcing legal and regulatory homogeneous 
standardization and conformance on those markets 
[39][23]. Jackson et al. [23] proposed a federal 
blockchain system to not only run different carbon 
markets with required function designs but also 
interoperate and allow data transfer between the 
different levels. Blockchains therefore promise support 
for networking global emission trading systems as well 
as an adoption approach that enables wider 
participation and engagement, enhancing the long-term 
effectiveness of the ETS mechanism. 
 
2.2. Technical Challenges  
 
While blockchain is believed to help transit from 
the centralized and linear models of carbon generation 
and consumption models towards decentralized, 
distributed and inclusive carbon trading systems, it 
faces challenges that need to be addressed if it is to 
deliver the desired environmental and social impacts. 
Currently, most focus has been on the recognition and 
resolution of technical obstacles [16][6].  
 
2.2.1. Excessive Energy Consumption. One of the 
most frequently discussed challenges for blockchain 
applications is energy requirement. The extent of such 
is a design choice determined by the openness of the 
network (permissioned or permissionless) and the type 
of consensus mechanism. A permissionless blockchain 
network with a “Proof-of-Work” (PoW) consensus, 
like the Bitcoin system, would require high 
computational power and attendant consumption of 
energy. The permissioned private blockchain system, 
in contrast, needs less energy because only a few nodes 
are entitled to put the next block of transactional 
records into the joint network data history. 
This does, however, impact security and scalability. 
The PoW mechanism enables all network nodes to 
compete to solve the mathematical formula and win the 
right to record. This solving process needs substantial 
power for repetitive trials and error exercises, making 
it unlikely for hackers to predict the winner and hence 
impossible to attack directly. One energy-efficient 
substitute to PoW is “Proof of Stake” (PoS) which 
derives from the Ethereum Blockchain and includes a 
voting system for choosing the validators from 
qualified nodes with coins staked. This type of 
consensus algorithm only needs a small amount of 
energy because the network participants do not have to 
search and seek appropriate hashes. Malicious attack to 
this algorithm requires hackers to purchase a large sum 
of tokens and hence quickly becomes uneconomic. For 
example, the Confidential Consortium (CoCo) 
Blockchain Framework from Microsoft is a 
permissioned private network that replaces the PoW 
mechanism with simplified consensus and reduced 
duplicative validation, greatly lowering the electricity 
consumption [40]. 
 
2.2.2. Limited Scalability. Scalability emphasizes the 
number of users blockchain could accommodate in a 
time interval and the speed with which it can validate 
the blocks. Permissionless blockchains normally 
struggle to scale up performance because of an 
inefficient consensus mechanism. Bitcoin, for example, 
has a 1MB block size and each block can hold around 
2,000 transactions. Restricted by the validating 
process, it takes an average of 10 minutes to produce a 
block, leading to seven transactions per second. In 
contrast, the Visa credit card system has over 65,000 
transactions processed within the same period. 
As noted in relation to energy consumption above, 
the challenge of scalability can be mitigated within a 
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permissioned blockchain system by replacing the PoW 
mechanism with a more effective consensus choice, 
realizing higher transaction volume at lower power. 
 
2.2.3. Rubbish in, Rubbish out. Although the 
blockchain system can keep data immutable, it is often 
misunderstood that data on the “chain” are accurate 
and represent the ‘truth’. In fact, blockchain cannot 
intrinsically guarantee data accuracy nor prevent any 
form of fraud or crime before data is moved onto the 
“chain”. When wrong data are inscribed in a block and 
finally transferred to the network with other blocks, the 
system does not verify, but preserves originality and 
replicates to other nodes for storage. This drawback is 
described as “Rubbish in, Rubbish out”. 
To improve data quality in the blockchain network, 
the accountability of the data provider and the process 
of data transfer, from generation to recording, should 
be ensured. While the former is more feasible in a 
permissioned network where participants’ actions can 
be designed to be transparent, the latter can be realized 
in conjunction with other technologies such as GPS, 
RFID, or other IoT devices, for automatic data transfer. 
 
2.3. Framing Challenges  
 
Research on IT innovation adoption and diffusion 
has accumulated a quite rich body of theoretical and 
empirical work. In this tradition, researchers tend to 
put more focus on the implementation phase, with less 
on the pre-adoption phase [7]. However, the pre-
adoption phase plays an important role for 
organizations to explore a technology’s features, 
investigate its benefits and challenges in the 
application domain, and determine whether or how 
much they will invest in it, especially when the 
technology is complex and potentially disruptive. 
Previous research on adoption has employed 
behavioural models, such as TRA [41], TAM [42], 
TPB [43], and UTAUT [44], to reveal factors that 
influence organizational adoption of a particular 
technology. Such research frames technology adoption 
as deterministic, yet provides limited insights into how 
potential adopters recognise a new technology as 
potentially relevant and then form assumptions, 
expectations, and knowledge of this innovation that 
shape their later actions. 
In this paper, technology is framed as social 
artifacts with their materials and functions embodying 
stakeholders’ knowledge, objectives, values, and 
interests in that technology [45]. We take a social-
cognitive approach to research the pre-adoption phase 
and use the theoretical lens of technological framing to 
identify the sets of members’ group frames pertaining 
to the assumptions, expectations, and knowledge 
stakeholders use to interpret technological 
phenomenon in a particular context [45][46][47][48] -
in this case blockchain in China’s carbon markets. 
3. Research methodology 
Our sample focuses on experts from China’s carbon 
markets who have an understanding of blockchain 
technologies and are capable of contextualizing its 
adoption. These include senior executives or managers 
who had profound domain knowledge of China’s 
carbon markets operation and had an in-depth 
understanding of IT; those who are IT experts with a 
sufficient understanding of China’s carbon markets 
operation; or those who are expert in both domains.  
The procedure for interview preparation had three 
steps: first, we started with the collection of online 
resources (conference reports, blogs, project 
whitepapers) that discuss blockchain application in 
China’s carbon markets and extracted a list of potential 
candidates for interview (retaining these sources for 
later triangulation of responses). We also considered 
that there might be experts in China’s carbon markets 
who are not visible in public, yet have a deep 
understanding of our research topic. Therefore, we 
identified key senior officers at the Ministry of 
Ecology and Environment of the People’s Republic of 
China responsible for ensuring attainment of national 
emission reduction targets and involved in governing 
China’s carbon markets [49]; the Certification and 
Accreditation Administration of the People’s Republic 
of China (CNCA) responsible for research and 
standardisation related to accreditation and conformity 
assessment (involving information system deployment 
standards in national carbon markets) [50]; the 
Alliance of Carbon Emissions Trading; the China 
Energy Conservation Association; and senior carbon 
trading managers in some enterprises such as China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).  
Holding these two name-lists, we used a personal 
research network established through two decades of 
collaborative international work involving the Chinese 
Academy of Science to approach experts directly, or 
indirectly through key industry conferences or events. 
Those experts meeting the selection criteria were sent 
an interview protocol and an interview arranged.  
These two steps only identified seven carbon 
market experts that met the criteria. Guided by 
purposive sampling and data saturation [51][52], we 
utilized the snowballing technique [53] to ask whom 
else the interviewee recommended as relevant to the 
study. Our sampling process ceased when no new 
informants were being recommended, leading to a total 
of 15 carbon market experts (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Interviewee characteristics 




 Co-Founder company providing blockchain solutions to carbon 
markets 
EBP 1PT01 Phone  
 Chairman & CEO carbon consulting service provider EBP 1PT02 Face to face 
 Co-Founder & CEO carbon consulting service provider EBP 1PT03 Face to face 
 Co-Founder carbon consulting service provider EBP 1PT04 Phone 
 CEO carbon consulting service provider EBP 1PT05 Phone 
 Co-Founder & CEO company providing blockchain solutions to carbon 
markets 
EBP 1PT06 Phone 
 Co-Founder & CEO company providing blockchain solutions to carbon 
markets 
EBP 1PT07 Face to Face 
 Strategy Director company providing blockchain solutions to carbon 
markets 
EBP 1PT07 Face to Face 
 Co-Founder & CEO company providing blockchain solutions to carbon 
markets 
EBP 1PT08 Phone 
 Deputy Director  Low carbon test and certification center EBK 2NP01 Face to Face  
 Secretary General Green Finance Association, Municipal Bureau of 
Financial work 
EBK 2NP02 Face to face 
 Operation Director Low Carbon Research Institute EBK 2NP03 Phone 
 IT leader information system service provider in carbon markets IT experts 3IT01 Face to Face 
 IT Manager information system service provider in carbon markets IT experts 3IT02 Face to Face 
 CEO information system service provider in carbon markets IT experts 3IT03 Face to Face 
Note: EBP (experts, with blockchain projects) are those with experience of innovative carbon 
mitigation projects that integrate blockchain technologies. EBK (experts, only with blockchain 
knowledge) are those reporting a strong understanding of blockchain but no project experience. 
 
3.1. Data analysis 
 
All interviews were recorded with explicit 
permission and then transcribed. The transcriptions 
were supplemented by, and triangulated with, the 
secondary data described earlier, enabling ambiguous 
expressions to be clarified and amplified. 
Following the procedures suggested by Corbin and 
Strauss [54], our analysis unfolded in two main phases. 
In the first phase, we began an “open coding” approach 
to identify concrete challenges as framed by different 
groups of experts. Interview transcripts were examined 
through a form of content analysis and expert quotes 
were categorized into first-order codes after the 
grouping of similar keywords and central meanings 
related to challenges. After several rounds of re-
examination, we settled on a set of first-order codes 
that covered as much of the data as possible, 
representing different ways in which experts perceive 
the challenges of blockchain application.  
In the second phase of coding, we re-grouped the 
first-order codes into more abstract second-order codes 
that summarised the concrete challenges into broader 
categories of challenges. We conducted an iterative 
examination with an objective to cover the majority of 
statements in the first-order codes. Eventually, seven 
frame content domains were generated, and theoretical 
saturation was achieved [55]. These domains were 
further compared and analyzed for similarities and 
differences across functions and experiences. 
4. Findings  
After conducting a deep analysis of the 
technological frames of three groups of experts, we 
adapted some of the frames proposed in Sun and 
Medaglia’s work [56] and finally resolved seven types 
of perceived challenges of blockchain application in 
China’s carbon markets: social; political, legal and 
policy-related; data; organizational and managerial; 
economic; context and technological.  
Table 2 below offers a summary of perceived 
challenges in the adoption of blockchain technology 
for each group across the seven dimensions. We 
explore key themes that emerge from the research in 
relation to carbon markets in the following section. 
 
4.1. Social challenges 
 
The social challenges to the wide adoption of 
blockchain in carbon markets were recognized by all  
three groups of experts. The first perspective 
frequently mentioned is a paucity of understanding of 
blockchain’s potentials in China’s carbon market 
[2NP02, 3IT01]. This finding is consistent with our 
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interviewee selection experience that experts knowing 
both areas remain rare.  
The second perspective is that the insufficient 
understanding causes people to distrust blockchain. 
Their cognition is generally influenced by associating 
blockchain with cryptocurrencies, imposing a negative 
connotation such as illicit transactions in the deep web 
and Ponzi schemes related to initial coin offerings 
(ICO) [1PT08, 2NP03].  
The third perspective focuses on difficulty in 
transforming from established centralization to the 
decentralization associated with blockchain [1PT06]. 
 
Table 2. Experts’ framing of challenges in blockchain adoption in carbon markets 
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4.2. Political, legal, and policy-related 
challenges 
 
All three expert groups mentioned these challenges, 
and, in particular for EBP, eight of nine experts had 
extensive discussions on these three perspectives.  
The feature of decentralization was seen as a 
political threat. In China, the carbon market 
mechanism is regarded as a policy instrument to reduce 
emission of greenhouse gas and thus the market 
requires a high level of involvement with governmental 
regulation and control. Adopting blockchain in the 
market raises central government concerns about 
disempowerment and dilution of its functions in 
regulating and controlling carbon emissions, 
particularly when the smart contract enables 
automation in carbon market management. One expert 
highlighted this challenge: “theoretically, blockchain 
can be adopted to realize the fair allocation of [carbon 
emission] permits, by putting issuing rules into the 
smart contract and automatically issuing [carbon 
permit] tokens. However, it is almost impossible for the 
government to do this because the automation would 
make the government lose control of adjusting the 
allowance in detail. This is like issuing fiat money out 
of control of the central bank” [2NP01]. In addition, 
the immutability and transparency of data records on 
blockchain generate another threat to national security 
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for the government. Once these data are leaked, the 
industrial distribution will be exposed, which threatens 
national economic security. As one expert emphasized: 
“To the government, the adoption of blockchain in the 
carbon market may violate their own interests making 
China’s national energy consumption data exposed to 
the globe for 100%. Even though there is a federal 
blockchain with permissioned access and transparency 
to all its user participants, it is highly likely that there 
are some spy companies exposing all energy 
consumption data to other countries. If one country 
knows our energy consumption data, they can infer 
what our national industrial chain is like, damaging 
national economic security” [1PT07]. 
Despite these political aspects, the regulation of 
blockchain adoption is largely nascent in carbon 
markets. There have been no official legal documents 
or regulation details that can guide the early practice, 
making it risky for the industry to embrace such 
technology rapidly [1PT04]. While current regulations 
of blockchain in the general finance industry and 
media opinion are strict, organizations in the carbon 
market are concerned about whether their efforts in 
early time will be in vain or, even worse, whether they 
will get punished as a result of some actions [1PT02]. 
To incentivize organizations to transfer their attention 
to blockchain, a positive policy environment is 
required to attract more practitioners. Without the 
government’s promotion and support in either 
coordination or finance, organizations will have a 
tough time making progress in pushing the adoption to 
a wider range [1PT03] – in China the development of 
industry is always driven by government [3IT01]. 
 
4.3. Data challenges 
 
Data challenges associated with blockchain 
adoption in carbon markets are framed as highly 
relevant by EBK and IT experts, but not by EBP. 
These data challenges include data quality, data 
security, and data ownership. 
The first data challenge is related to data quality 
which consists of two levels. First, although blockchain 
is advantageous for immutability and traceability of 
data recorded on the chain, this does not mean the 
original data itself is authentic and accurate: “the 
allocation of carbon emission permits concerns report 
data from each company. However, if these original 
data were falsified before reporting to the government, 
then authenticity and accuracy would not be solved 
even when blockchain develops to version 10.0” 
[1PT01].  
Second, the data collection method can also 
influence data quality. Traditional manual collection of 
MRV data can bring in intentional or unintentional 
errors, and hence blockchain still needs collaboration 
with some other mature technologies to maintain high 
data quality: “Blockchain only solves out the digital 
trust problem. To transform the business world to be 
digitalization, how to map the physical world with the 
digital world is key. We need advanced technologies 
like IoT to maintain the authenticity and reliability of 
original data” [1PT06]. 
The second challenge, framed by EBK, is data 
security: “Organizations are now unduly reticent on 
their [carbon] data because these relate to business 
secrets. An expert can easily estimate your company’s 
production and scale once knowing your data. 
Therefore, data security is influential to organizational 
enthusiasm in carbon mitigation efforts” [2NP02].  
The third challenge is related to the uncertainty of 
data ownership. Since the data on the chain are 
transparent to all participating nodes, each node will 
gain a copy of the total data. This generates a risk of 
drawing boundaries of data ownership: “in a federal 
chain, how do we take account of the data ownership, 
what legal structure should we draw on to identify such 
boundaries, and how to define the boundaries before 
moving on the chain” [3IT02]. 
 
4.4. Organizational and managerial challenges 
 
Organizational and managerial challenges are 
framed by all three groups of experts. Two levels of 
issues were typically reported: inter-organizational 
management levels such as the challenge of 
coordination [1PT04, 2NP02], and human resource 
level inside an organization, in particular lack of talent 
in what is viewed as an interdisciplinary task in both 
industry [3IT01] and government [1PT03]. 
 
4.5. Economic challenges 
 
Economic challenges are framed by the EBP group 
more frequently than the other two groups. These 
challenges are typical of investments in new 
technology and include the high cost required for 
application in the carbon markets [3IT03, 1PT03] and 
the unclear profits it brings to the business in a novel 
and potentially volatile market [1PT05, 2NP02]. 
 
4.6. Context challenges  
 
Context challenges were emphasized only by 
practitioners and IT experts, and appear at two levels: 
at the macro level, such as insufficient market 
maturity; and at the micro level, such as in the lack of 
appropriate application scenarios. 
The first challenge is related to the preparation of 
China’s carbon market. China just started its pilot 
Page 5652
carbon markets from 2013 and the national carbon 
market from 2017. First, from a broad perspective, the 
current adoption of blockchain does not match the 
short-term and mid-term goals of China’s carbon 
market: “the short-term goal entails the establishment 
of active carbon trading in the national carbon market. 
During this time, it is apparent that using the 
centralized method to build the market and start 
trading is better than a decentralized one. The mid-
term goal includes the completion of specific emission 
goals […]. Using administrative measures to apportion 
these goals to different key emitters seem to be more 
effective than decentralized choices. Adopting 
blockchain in China’s carbon market is just like using 
a knife to open a can” [1PT01].  
Second, much fundamental work in the carbon 
market is still in progress, leaving a weak foundation 
for blockchain implementation. These include 
inadequate preparation of the market: regulation and 
standardization of carbon trading is not robust enough, 
falling behind other industries and inconsistent across 
provinces [3IT01, 3IT02].  
 
4.7. Technological challenges 
 
Technology challenges, framed only by the 
practitioners and non-practitioners, include the 
engineering nature and functional characteristics of 
blockchain: the low transaction speed [2NP01], limited 
data storage space [1PT02], and extensive energy 
consumption [2NP01]. 
5. Discussion  
Exposing the technological frames held by three 
key actors has provided several insights into the 
progress and prospects for carbon market development 
and integration within China. Key to understanding the 
pace of development is the incongruence surfaced by 
this study. For example, while EBP and IT experts 
highlight the contextual challenges of blockchain 
adoption, EBK does not mention these challenges. This 
frame incongruence may be due to the different 
attitudes held by people with or without IT interaction: 
attitude from experts with practice is based on more 
evaluative beliefs of usefulness and richer perceptions 
[57]. Following media coverage on the hype of 
blockchain, experts without practice are perhaps more 
likely to think about the usefulness or challenges of 
blockchain to carbon markets, but ignore the 
justification of context suitability.  
Another instance of frame incongruence is that 
while IT experts are confident in blockchain functions 
to date, both EBP and EBK groups are highly 
concerned. This paradox may be due to a knowledge 
background where IT experts have a stronger 
understanding of technological development in the 
short and long run. 
 
5.1. Implications for Practice 
 
5.1.1. Devising guidelines for blockchain adoption. 
Different expert groups have some differences in 
framing the challenges of blockchain adoption. While 
non-IT experts perceived that technological 
development is still needed, IT experts suggested that 
blockchain itself is already functionally capable of 
improving the efficiency of carbon markets. Assuming 
that both views are based on relevant expertise, this 
divergence indicates that policy-makers devising 
guidelines should survey widely to avoid vision lock-in 
[56]. 
 
5.1.2. Facilitating adoption with relevant processes 
and infrastructure. Insights from experts in China’s 
carbon markets present a picture of the current state of 
blockchain adoption and help set a trajectory for 
technology development. Iansiti and Lakhani [3] 
developed a framework that maps the development 
strategies of blockchain in four steps based on novelty 
and complexity of adoption context. The present study 
supports their contention that understanding the 
context and anticipated trajectory of blockchain use 
can help direct organizations, industries and 
government to establish relevant processes and 
infrastructure that facilitate adoption, diffusion and 
hence impact. 
6. Conclusion 
This study aimed to explore the challenges of 
blockchain adoption in carbon markets by focusing on 
three key expert groups: experts with blockchain 
knowledge only, experts with blockchain projects, and 
IT experts. Using a technology frames lens, we 
resolved seven frames detailing the challenges those 
experts perceive (Section 4). Comparing these frames 
of challenges surfaced new insights into the current 
state and development trajectory of blockchain 
technology applied to carbon market development and 
integration in China. Contrasting these frames 
highlighted incongruence that, if ignored, may lead to 
vision lock-in and sub-optimal implementation.  
It should be remembered that this work is 
exploratory and although it confirms general 
observations about technology implementation and 
adoption, we recognize the limited generalisability of 
our research findings due to a narrow domain focus, a 
narrow regional focus, and the low number and 
diversity of respondents reached at saturation [52] [58]. 
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However, this work identifies and starts to address a 
number of research gaps: extending the current 
discussion on blockchain from technical aspects to 
socio-technical aspects and hence moving to more 
rigorous empirical and theory-driven research on 
blockchain within the IS discipline that sets the 
technical challenges in a much wider context and sets 
the foundation for a non-deterministic approach to 
research adoption and diffusion of blockchain 
technology.  
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